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In view of Proposition 9.2.1, the stationary version fb*; t 0; 1; . . .g has a wellt de ned (auto)covariance function G : R 3 R, say, * G h Cov b*; bt h ; t Proposition 9.4.1. We have h 0; 1; . . . : 9:16 t; h 0; 1; . . . : 9:15

The functional requirements for new applications at the planning and development stages can include strong access controls from the start. When designing access controls and security for new applications, you must consider security from end to end of the business process; from the original keyboard entries into the application right to the printed report on its way to the mailroom. Table 8-1 provides a design starting point, building on the OSI Seven-Layer Network model by adding a layer for physical access security as the first point

^ G h lE s h lE s P s > h ;

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The rst equality in Eq. (9.16) is established in Cox and Isham [7] and the second equality follows readily from the de nition (9.9). From Eq. (9.16) we nd the autocorrelation function g : R 3 R of the M=G=I process l; s to be given by g h G h ^ P s > h ; G 0 h 0; 1; . . . : 9:17

In short, if virtual methods are used, granting an applet permission to access an object amounts to also granting that applet the ability to export indirect access to that object to any other applet. This has a clear weakening effect on any assurance about the protection of an object. For static methods, such access is

Proposition 9.4.1 shows that the correlation structure of the stationary M =G=I ^ input process l; s is completely determined by the pmf of s (thus of s). It turns out

8

that the inverse is true as well. Indeed, Eqs. (9.9) and (9.17) together imply ^ ^ g h g h 1 P s > h P s > h 1 1 P s > h ; h 0; 1; . . . ; E s

prohibited, since static methods do not change the applet context Restricting virtual methods in the same way that static methods are restricted may add some complexity to sharing schemes The upshot of this change would be that an applet will be forced to share the object explicitly with all other applets that directly or indirectly need to be granted access permission By far the biggest risk presented in the design of Card Java is a potential ability for a vendor to add and use Native methods on the platform Obviously, this will compromise portability (applets that use Native methods will not be automatically portable to other cards), and it may expose the card to dangerous code that exists outside the applet firewalls In fact, if Native methods are available, the concept of firewalls deteriorates Native code is not restricted by the JCRE mediation of access, and misuse is possible.

9:18

so that the mapping h 3 g h is necessarily decreasing and integer-convex. Taking into account the facts g 0 1 and P s > 0 1, we conclude from Eq. (9.18) (with h 0) that E s 1 1 g 1 9:19

The very real security concern is that an attack applet will make use of Native code to carry out operations that would otherwise be stopped by the JCRE When Native code executes, all bets are off for the Java Virtual Machine and its protection mechanisms Native code in applets completely breaks the idea behind Java security Attack applets are likely to make use of Native method calls The five new risks we have covered were introduced into Java with its transformation to Card Java Although Card Java certainly presents an intriguing new set of risks in terms of security, it does nothing to address several important fundamental security concerns associated with smart cards, including the problem of physical attacks and the terminal problem (both discussed earlier in the chapter).

of concern for end-to-end security designs. It also adds three other layers to consider: data file storage, data fields within a file, and operating systems. Take each application through an evaluation based on Table 8-1 by answering Yes or No for each of the 11 layers.

with g 1 < 1 necessarily by the niteness of E s . Combining Eqs. (9.18) and (9.19) we nd that P s > h Note also from Eq. (9.20) that E s

h 0; 1; . . . :

It is important to keep in mind that the non-Java-related problems have a real impact on card security and that they are not solved by Card Java..

9:20

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